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NOTE: EXPLORING THE PROMISE AND
POTENTIAL OF A WTO ANTICORRUPTION TREATY
CHRISTINE E. DRYDEN*
I
INTRODUCTION
Laws criminalizing foreign bribery are under-enforced. Efforts to reduce
foreign bribery have resulted in increased awareness of the problems of
corruption, widely-agreed-upon treaties, and domestic legislation. Despite this,
anti-bribery laws often exist only on the books; they are not actively enforced. A
new treaty, negotiated at the World Trade Organization (WTO), could improve
enforcement. Despite the recent failure of multilateral trade negotiations at the
WTO,1 the WTO would likely still provide an effective forum for plurilateral
agreements. The WTO is an appropriate forum for an anti-bribery treaty because
corruption and anti-corruption efforts affect trade, and anti-corruption efforts
align with the WTO’s goals of promoting transparency and good governance. The
proposed treaty could improve enforcement because it would include not only
legislative and preventive obligations similar to those in other anti-corruption
treaties but also substantive enforcement obligations. And, because it would be
negotiated at the WTO, it would come with an international forum for resolving
disputes and, therefore, for enforcing enforcement. The enforcement obligations
proposed by this note include criteria that have already been used to assess
whether states are enforcing anti-bribery laws. These more specific requirements
should make compliance clearer and breach more obvious and thus easier to
prove. Further, this note addresses which actors would have standing to sue at
the WTO. It also suggests possible remedies for breach and discusses how to
calculate the level of nullification and impairment for those remedies.
Part II of this note describes why a new anti-bribery treaty is necessary. Part
III recommends the WTO as a forum for this treaty. Part IV discusses existing
anti-corruption treaties and the substantive requirements of the treaty proposed
by this note. Part V addresses which actors would have standing to sue, describes
how a claim of breach would proceed, and suggests possible remedies. Part VI
concludes.

Copyright © 2016 by Christine E. Dryden. This note is an addendum to Volume 78, Issue 4.
This note is also available online at http://lcp.law.duke.edu/.
* J.D., 2016. Law clerk to Judge Lynn N. Hughes, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Texas. Thank you to Professor Rachel Brewster for supervising this note.
1. Global Trade After the Failure of the Doha Round, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 1, 2016),
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II
FILLING THE INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT VOID: THE NEED FOR A NEW
ANTI-CORRUPTION TREATY
Though once perceived as the “cost of doing business,” bribery is now seen
as detrimental to an efficient global economy.2 Having a stable and accountable
government that can maintain a growing, market-based economy becomes more
difficult when government officials receive side payments. Without more
vigorous enforcement measures in place, undesirable, yet persistent, abuses of
the law will continue unhindered, and crime will continue to pay. Thus, to reduce
corruption, the cost of doing business corruptly must be raised.3 This can be
achieved by threatening the supplier of the bribe with sanctions, fines, or criminal
prosecutions. Because corruption has been recognized as harmful to the
economy, anti-corruption has become the subject of domestic legislation and
international treaties.4
What the current international anti-corruption program lacks is enforcement.
Much of the world seems to agree that corruption is not only morally repugnant
but also economically inefficient.5 Regional and international treaties condemn
corruption. Yet these treaties fail to provide an international enforcement
mechanism, leaving enforcement solely to the domestic mechanisms.6 As a result,
anti-corruption laws are under-enforced.7 A new anti-corruption treaty with an
enforcement mechanism could improve enforcement and thus reduce corruption.
Because the WTO already has a forum for enforcing its rules, it could be an
effective organization under which to negotiate this new treaty.
Two existing anti-corruption treaties will be discussed—the United Nations
Convention against Corruption (UNCAC) and the Organization for Economic
Co-operation and Development Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Convention).
Both suffer from the same problem—domestic enforcement only.8 The OECD

2. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, International Actors and the Promises and Pitfalls of AntiCorruption Reform, 34 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 447, 454 (2013) (describing corruption as hindering efficient
markets).
3. See Patrick X. Delaney, Transnational Corruption: Regulation Across Borders, 47 VA. J. INT’L
L. 413, 436 (2007) (assuming that corporations are rational actors that would weigh the costs and benefits
of bribery).
4. See, e.g., United Nations Convention against Corruption, Oct. 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41
[hereinafter UNCAC]; Bribery Act 2010, c. 23 (UK), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2010/23/
contents [https://perma.cc/N6XV-YN9M].
5. Philip M. Nichols, Outlawing Transnational Bribery Through the World Trade Organization, 28
LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 305, 321–22 (1997).
6. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 474.
7. See Rachel Brewster, The Domestic and International Enforcement of the OECD Anti-Bribery
Convention, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 84, 93, 106 (2014) (most states parties to the OECD Convention do not
enforce, or hardly enforce their foreign anti-bribery laws).
8. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Introduction: The Role of International Actors in Fighting Corruption,
in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY: CAN INTERNATIONAL ACTORS PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE? 3, 24
(Susan Rose-Ackerman & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2013).
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publishes regular monitoring reports, but this “name-and-shame” method of
sanctioning signatories does not seem to be especially effective.9 The degree to
which a state is required to enforce its anti-corruption laws is ambiguous, and
enforcement levels are correspondingly low.10 Though states parties have largely
complied with obligations to enact domestic anti-bribery laws, they might have
an incentive not to enforce them.11 This is because permitting their corporations
and individuals to bribe could help states win business abroad.12 Rational parties
will analyze the cost of bribery in comparison with the rate of detection and
behave accordingly. If penalties or chances of detection remain low, rational
actors might conclude that crime will pay.13 Assuming that persons and
corporations that contemplate bribing foreign officials are rational actors, they
are likely to bribe foreign officials when, as is currently the case, the cost of
bribing a foreign official is quite low considering the odds of ever being
prosecuted.14
Despite incentives to do otherwise, a few states actively enforce anti-bribery
laws.15 These states include the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany,
and Switzerland.16 Most states parties to the OECD Convention do not enforce
their anti-bribery laws or enforce them minimally.17 And the handful of states
actively enforcing the anti-bribery laws probably do not compensate for the states
not enforcing those laws. For example, though the United States sometimes
prosecutes foreign corporations, it mostly prosecutes its own corporations for
foreign bribery.18
Despite potential for lack of enforcement or uneven enforcement, the
situation in which some states actively and broadly enforce treaty obligations
while others do not enforce them at all might actually improve enforcement.19
Treaties allow states that want to enforce the treaty to exercise broader
jurisdictional grounds than are typically acceptable.20 Thus, those states can more
easily enforce the treaty for other states parties.21 As a result, overall enforcement
is improved not only because of the enforcing state’s direct actions, but also (at
least in the case of foreign bribery) because the enforcing state’s actions
encourage other states to increase their own enforcement efforts.22
9. See id. at 23.
10. Brewster, supra note 7, at 106.
11. Id. at 100–01.
12. Id.
13. Delaney, supra note 3, at 436.
14. Id.
15. Thomas J. Bussen, Midnight in the Garden of Ne Bis in Idem: The New Urgency for an
International Enforcement Mechanism, 23 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 485, 496 (2015).
16. Brewster, supra note 7, at 106.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 107.
19. Maggie Gardner, Channeling Unilateralism, 56 HARV. INT’L L.J. 297, 301–02 (2015).
20. Id. at 317.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 330.
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However, that a few states vigorously prosecute bribery and most others
hardly prosecute it at all might be causing more of a twofold problem of both too
much and too little prosecution.23 When a state (often, the United States) brings
an anti-bribery case against a corporation, that corporation might at some point
admit guilt.24 This admission could occur as a result of conviction or as part of a
settlement.25 Unlike in U.S. domestic law, there is no bar against double jeopardy
in international law.26 Once a corporation admits guilt in one state, other states
can free ride on this admission to reap the rewards of imposing monetary
sanctions on this corporation.27
Spotty enforcement is not helping anyone, except perhaps corrupt
governments who can still get investment from non-enforcing states.28 A treaty
with an international enforcement mechanism could benefit many actors. The
economic inefficiencies of corruption would be reduced as corruption is reduced.
And this system could benefit those states that do not actively enforce antibribery laws due to limited resources rather than limited enthusiasm, because
international enforcement obligations would provide political cover for enforcing
anti-corruption laws.29
III
THE WTO’S INSTITUTIONAL ADVANTAGES AS A FORUM FOR THE NEW
TREATY
Transnational anti-corruption efforts can be classified as part of international
trade law, because anti-corruption treaties and related domestic legislation affect
how trade is conducted.30 The WTO would therefore be an appropriate forum for
a new anti-corruption treaty. It already has an established enforcement
mechanism, and its goals align with the aims of reducing corruption. The WTO’s
goals include reducing barriers to trade.31 The goals of anti-corruption include
“efficient international markets”32 and economic growth.33 Indeed, corruption
may function as a barrier to trade.34 Like a tariff, corruption requires an exporting
country to pay extra.35 And corruption can block competition, resulting in a

23. Bussen, supra note 15, at 509.
24. Id. at 500.
25. See id. (guilt often admitted as part of settlement in the United States).
26. Id. at 498.
27. Id. at 501.
28. See id. at 507.
29. Id. at 512.
30. Eric C. Chaffee, From Legalized Business Ethics to International Trade Regulation, 65 MERCER
L. REV. 701, 705–08 (2014); id. at 722–23.
31. Understanding the WTO: What We Stand For, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/what_stand_for_e.htm [https://perma.cc/WD8V-PZVL].
32. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 8, at 15.
33. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 455.
34. Nichols, supra note 5, at 333–34.
35. Id.
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monopoly for certain favored corporations.36 Corruption also increases the cost
of public works and diverts money from citizens at large to corrupt officials.37 The
WTO promotes transparency and good governance.38 “[C]orruption is a
symptom of a poorly functioning government,”39 and its source is secrecy.40 Thus,
reducing corruption and increasing transparency go hand in hand.
A formal enforcement requirement and the WTO forum offer many benefits.
To deter bribery, not only does the cost of corruption need to be high, but the
cost of honesty needs to be correspondingly low; it must be beneficial to behave
honestly.41 The cost of honesty would be low if many states were truly compelled
to follow anti-bribery laws. This is an advantage of the WTO. Many states are
members,42 so an individual state would not have reason to suspect that it is in
the minority in enforcing its anti-bribery laws. And because the WTO has a
preexisting dispute resolution entity—the Dispute Settlement Mechanism
(DSM)—at which noncompliant states can be sued, each state can feel confident
that other states are enforcing their anti-corruption laws.43 Furthermore, the
WTO wants to make the rules of trade “transparent and predictable.”44 Anticorruption obligations will help achieve these goals by eliminating disguised and
informal additional costs of trade.
Currently, a multilateral agreement of the entire WTO membership seems
unlikely.45 However, an anti-corruption treaty need not be multilateral; it could
be effective as a plurilateral46 agreement. The treaty proposed here targets the
supply side47 of foreign bribery and, like the OECD Convention, requires the
participation of significant exporters to be useful. Because the OECD
Convention has an effective membership but an ineffective enforcement
mechanism, this treaty could have more or less the same membership as the
36. Id. at 335.
37. Paul Sarlo, The Spaghetti Bowl Revisited in the Context of Corruption: Understanding How
Corrupt Countries Could Subvert the WTO’s Rule-Oriented System Through Preferential Trade
Agreements, 43 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 9–10 (2014).
38. Padideh Ala’i, The WTO and the Anti-Corruption Movement, 6 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 259,
260 (2008).
39. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 456.
40. Ala’i, supra note 38, at 278.
41. Rose-Ackerman, supra note 2, at 460.
42. Understanding the WTO: Members and Observers, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm [https://perma.cc/7B57-56SV].
43. See Brewster, supra note 7, at 106 (explaining that when states are not confident that other states
are actually enforcing their anti-corruption laws, they are likely to also not enforce anti-corruption laws).
44. Chaffee, supra note 30, at 724 (quoting What Is the WTO? Who We Are, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/who_we_are_e.htm [https://perma.cc/K3TZ-NEQD]).
45. See Global Trade After the Failure of the Doha Round, supra note 1 (describing the failure of
the Doha Round and the unlikeliness of a multilateral agreement in the near future).
46. That is, a treaty among less than all the members. Understanding the WTO: Plurilaterals, WTO,
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm10_e.htm [https://perma.cc/HWP9-6LBW].
47. The supply side of bribery means the corporations and individuals paying bribes. The demand
side means the government officials receiving the bribes. On the supply and demand side of bribery, see
Elizabeth K. Spahn, Multijurisdictional Bribery Law Enforcement: The OECD Anti-Bribery Convention,
53 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 11 (2012).
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OECD Convention (that is, the significant capital exporters48 among the WTO
membership and certainly less than the entire WTO membership). It is the
presence of the WTO’s well-respected enforcement mechanism—not an increase
in states parties to anti-corruption treaties—that will result in increased
enforcement and reduced corruption.
Although the WTO does not directly deal with corruption,49 it might already
be moving toward addressing it. Indirectly, the WTO appears, but does not claim,
to be on a path to rejecting corruption.50 For example, In US—Gambling,51 the
United States defended its prohibition against internet gambling partially “on the
ground that internet gambling would benefit organized crime and facilitate fraud
and corruption,”52 under the public morals exception.53 Furthermore, the WTO’s
Revised Government Procurement Agreement (GPA) seems to recognize that
the WTO has the potential to deal with corruption, at least in the state action
realm of government procurement.54 According to the Revised GPA, a state
“shall conduct . . . procurement in a transparent and impartial manner that . . .
prevents corrupt practices.”55 The Revised GPA is a plurilateral agreement, not
binding on the entire membership, so it should not be interpreted as too strongly
supporting the existence of a WTO anti-corruption agenda.56 But it seems to at
least suggest that corruption is a topic the WTO could address.57
Various possible roles for the WTO in anti-corruption have been suggested.
Before the OECD Convention or the UNCAC, the WTO was recommended as
a forum for addressing corruption.58 It had an enforcement mechanism in place,
and its members were major trading states—the very states most likely to be
involved in corrupt international transactions.59 The actions proposed for the
WTO were requiring member states to criminalize paying and receiving bribes
and to bar slush funds.60 These proposals have come into existence. The OECD

48. See Brewster, supra note 7, at 96 (“[F]or [a supply-side anti-bribery regime] to be effective, . . .
[]most capital exporting states[] need to participate.”).
49. Chaffee, supra note 30, at 724.
50. Mark Pieth, From Talk to Action: The OECD Experience, in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY: CAN
INTERNATIONAL ACTORS PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE, supra note 8, at 151, 153.
51. Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and
Betting Services, ¶ 6.558, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/R (adopted Apr. 20, 2005).
52. Joost Pauwelyn, Different Means, Same End: The Contribution of Trade and Investment Treaties
to Anti-Corruption Policy, in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY: CAN INTERNATIONAL ACTORS PLAY A
CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE?, supra note 8, at 247, 255.
53. General Agreement on Trade in Services art. XIV, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869 U.N.T.S. 183.
54. Pauwelyn, supra note 52, at 256.
55. Revised Agreement on Government Procurement art. IV, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 4, 1869 U.N.T.S. 508 [hereinafter GPA].
56. Sarlo, supra note 37, at 6.
57. Pauwelyn, supra note 52, at 256.
58. Nichols, supra note 5, at 362.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 378, 380.
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Convention requires states to criminalize paying bribes and to bar slush funds.61
The UNCAC prohibits receiving bribes.62 What has not come to pass is an anticorruption treaty in a forum that provides enforcement.
More recently, in light of the failure to enforce anti-corruption laws, it has
been proposed that direct anti-corruption measures are failing; indirect methods
of reducing corruption should therefore be used instead.63 Because the WTO
provides for transparency and encourages good governance, it might be the best
forum for indirect corruption reduction.64 The WTO’s culture of transparency
and due process could help fight corruption, and the organization is wellpositioned to promote these goals.65
Others have recommended enforcement by different international
organizations. Though acknowledging a potential role for WTO involvement in
anti-corruption, some have endorsed anti-corruption efforts in other fora. Some
suggest delegating anti-corruption efforts to the UN because of the organization’s
large membership,66 and others propose creating an entirely new international
organization—one with an enforcement mechanism—to specifically target
corruption.67
A recent proposal for new approaches to reducing corruption supported
forming an independent anti-corruption court.68 This court would be similar to
the International Criminal Court (ICC) in that it would also be an international
court that steps in when a state is either unwilling or unable to investigate and
prosecute certain designated offenses.69 With independent prosecutors, judges,
and investigators, this court would almost certainly enforce anti-corruption laws
enthusiastically. But the proposed court has several flaws. A brand new court
could be a hard sell. If the ICC itself is any indication, convincing states to
acquiesce to a new forum for international judicial supervision is difficult.70 And
the anti-corruption court would have jurisdiction over the demand side, not
merely the supply side, thus it would be prosecuting states’ officials.71 This would
intrude on sovereignty and might be more insulting to states than an instrument

61. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Convention on Combating Bribery
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions art. 1, 8, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1
[hereinafter OECD Convention].
62. UNCAC art. 15, supra note 4, 2349 U.N.T.S. at 154.
63. Ala’i, supra note 38, at 278.
64. Id. at 260.
65. Id. at 278.
66. Bussen, supra note 15, at 510.
67. Chaffee, supra note 30, at 723–24, 728.
68. Mark L. Wolf, The Case for an International Anti-Corruption Court, GOVERNANCE STUDIES
AT BROOKINGS 10 (July 2014), http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2014/07/inter
national-anti-corruption-court-wolf/anticorruptioncourtwolffinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/76VY-2XRC].
69. Id.
70. Matthew Stephenson, The Case Against an International Anti-Corruption Court, GAB: THE
GLOBAL ANTICORRUPTION BLOG (July 31, 2014), http://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2014/07/31/thecase-against-an-international-anti-corruption-court/ [https://perma.cc/8GZC-PCZH].
71. See Wolf, supra note 68, at 5–8.
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that targets bribe-paying corporations.72 Trying to force reluctant states to accept
an entirely new decisionmaking body that is powerful and has the ability to
intrude on sovereignty could be too much too fast, thereby undermining the
willingness of undecided parties to support reform efforts altogether.73
In addition to alternative fora, there are other potential problems with the
WTO as the forum for a new treaty against corruption. Most fundamentally, the
WTO is an entity with a limited sphere of expertise; it does not purport to, nor
should it have to deal with all international issues.74 Even if the WTO decided to
enter the anti-corruption arena, corrupt states could use preferential trade
agreements (PTAs) to subvert WTO rules and promulgate corrupt schemes.75
Assuming a new treaty is negotiated and the treaty requires enforcement, the
level of enforcement required might be unclear.76 Thus, in a case before a WTO
panel, the complaining party could insist that the treaty has been breached while
the defending party could assert that it has met its obligations.77 Despite these
alternative suggestions and potential problems, the WTO forum has the
advantages of having a large membership and a well-respected existing dispute
resolution mechanism.
IV
DIFFERENTIATING THE PROPOSED WTO TREATY FROM THE OECD ANTIBRIBERY CONVENTION AND THE UNCAC
A. The OECD Convention
Though it has strong legislation requirements, the OECD Convention has
weak enforcement requirements. The OECD Convention is narrow in scope but
relatively deep in commitment. It combines hard law and soft law.78 The OECD
Convention is strict when it comes to enacting domestic laws.79 The language used
makes criminalizing the bribing of a foreign government official mandatory.80
Signatories must criminalize the act of bribing a foreign official—the hard law
component.81 But signatories are left to their own devices to domestically enforce
the written anti-bribery laws.82 The OECD’s only power to enforce the treaty
obligations is monitoring each state’s compliance and issuing public reports—the

72. Stephenson, supra note 70.
73. Id.
74. Philip M. Nichols, Corruption in the World Trade Organization: Discerning the Limits of the
World Trade Organization’s Authority, 28 N.Y.U.J. INT’L L. & POL. 711, 716 (1996).
75. Sarlo, supra note 37.
76. Brewster, supra note 7, at 103.
77. See id. at 105 (raising the possibility that there would be no agreement as to what is a breach).
78. Pieth, supra note 50, at 153.
79. ABIOLA O. MAKINWA, PRIVATE REMEDIES FOR CORRUPTION 122 (2013).
80. Id.
81. OECD Convention art. 1, supra note 61, 37 I.L.M. at 4.
82. OECD Convention art. 5, supra note 61, 37 I.L.M. at 5.

DRYDEN (DO NOT DELETE)

No. 4 2016]

2/8/2017 3:48 PM

A WTO ANTI-CORRUPTION TREATY

257

soft law name-and-shame component.83
The OECD Convention is aimed only at bribery’s supply side.84 That is, the
individuals and corporations that pay bribes to foreign government officials
should, by the terms of the treaty, be criminals in their home states.85 The treaty
does not address the demand side: it says nothing about the foreign government
officials receiving bribes.86 Wealthy, developed countries whose corporations
engage in business internationally comprise most of the OECD’s membership,87
thus the supply-side-only design of the OECD Convention targets the actors over
which the signatories have the most control.
B. The UN Convention Against Corruption
The UNCAC seeks to deal with a broad range of corrupt activities for a broad
range of signatories, but its commitments are shallow and toothless. The UNCAC
is broad in scope, addressing a variety of corrupt activities, but in many ways, it
is aspirational. It has 140 signatories.88 It addresses both supply-side and demandside bribery.89 Some of the corrupt behaviors it condemns include private sector
bribery, trading in influence, illicit enrichment, and abuse of functions.90 It
emphasizes preventing corruption.91 And, when corruption is discovered, it
permits asset recovery.92
Commitments made under the UNCAC might not be as wide-ranging as they
seem. Many corrupt behaviors are criminalized, optionally.93 Optional provisions
include abuse of functions, trading in influence, illicit enrichment, private sector
bribery, and private sector embezzlement, all of which states parties need merely
“consider” criminalizing.94 Furthermore, to say that the UNCAC applies to both
supply-side and demand-side bribery may be an overstatement because
criminalizing demand-side bribery is optional under the UNCAC.95 Asset
83. Bussen, supra note 15, at 494; Pieth, supra note 50, at 153.
84. Spahn, supra note 47, at 11.
85. See Pauwelyn, supra note 52, at 259 (describing demand-side versus supply-side anti-bribery
efforts).
86. See id.
87. List of OECD Member Countries, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/listoecd-member-countries.htm [https://perma.cc/UUG7-TV2Q] (last visited Nov. 13, 2015).
88. United Nations Convention against Corruption Signature and Ratification Status as of 1 April
2015, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html
[https://perma.cc/G4YJ-EF9R].
89. UNCAC art. 15, supra note 4, 2349 U.N.T.S. at 154.
90. UNCAC Chapter III, supra note 4, 2349 U.N.T.S. at 154–63.
91. On prevention, see UNCAC Chapter II, supra note 4, 2349 U.N.T.S. at 148–54; Convention
Highlights, U.N. OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/ treaties/CAC/
convention-highlights.html [https://perma.cc/PEG5-5HRP].
92. UNCAC arts. 31, 53, supra note 4, 2349 U.N.T.S. at 159–60, 175.
93. Valsamis Mitsilegas, The European Union and the Rest of the World: Criminal Law and Policy
Interconnections, in BEYOND THE ESTABLISHED LEGAL ORDERS 149, 163–65 (Malcolm Evans & Panos
Koutrakos eds., 2011).
94. UNCAC arts. 18–22, supra note 4, 2349 U.N.T.S. at 155–56.
95. Chaffee, supra note 30, at 721–22.
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recovery has the potential to deter criminal acts, but the UNCAC’s asset recovery
is also not as strong as it would appear.96 Asset recovery is a technically complex
endeavor; true expertise is needed to trace the source of assets.97 Because asset
recovery is to be undertaken domestically,98 it will accomplish next to nothing in
states without the resources to successfully recover assets.99 Though the UNCAC
addresses a range of corrupt activities, it has no enforcement mechanism other
than monitoring.100 There is no enforcing court or other body.101 And even the
monitoring process is not “robust.”102
C. The New Treaty Proposal
The treaty this note recommends would contain elements of the OECD
Convention and the UNCAC as well as additional, unique features. A new treaty
negotiated at the WTO should focus narrowly on the supply side (like the OECD
Convention), promote prevention (like the UNCAC), include substantive
enforcement requirements, and provide for enforcement within the WTO DSM.
Thus, for a signatory to both the UNCAC and the OECD Convention, the key
differences will be that enforcement obligations are expressly written into the
treaty103 and that the treaty can be enforced in an international forum.
Negotiating this new anti-corruption treaty requires at least the significant
capital exporters among the WTO’s many members to make a deep commitment.
Having an international enforcement forum where they might be sanctioned
probably means that WTO members will hesitate to commit to too much. So a
narrower commitment, such as criminalizing only the act of bribing a foreign
government official, would likely prove more successful than a broad
commitment. States and corporations interested in leveling the playing field by
preventing competitors from bribing, corporations interested in reducing costs,
and states and other actors interested in eliminating corruption on principle
might support a new treaty, as they did the OECD Convention.104 If these
supporters of the OECD Convention were hoping that it would result in reduced
corruption,105 they could be disappointed by the low level of enforcement and the
likely limited effects of the OECD Convention on reducing bribery. A treaty that
promises enforcement could thus be appealing.
96. Philippa Webb, The United Nations Convention Against Corruption, 8 J. INT’L ECON. L. 191,
206–12 (2005).
97. Id.
98. UNCAC arts. 53, 31, supra note 4, 2349 U.N.T.S. at 159–60, 175.
99. Webb, supra note 96, at 206–12.
100. Bussen, supra note 15, at 494.
101. Webb, supra note 96, at 222–29.
102. Id. at 228.
103. See Brewster, supra note 7, at 93 (current OECD Convention enforcement obligations are
ambiguous).
104. See Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, Values and Interests: International Legalization in the
Fight Against Corruption, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 141, 145–47 (2002) (describing the actors and related
interests involved in developing the OECD Convention).
105. See id.
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In addition to being a narrower and therefore more palatable commitment,
criminalizing only supply-side bribery avoids an entirely different problem—
infringing on sovereignty.106 Similar to states parties to the OECD Convention,
WTO members would need to enact domestic laws prohibiting individuals and
corporations from paying bribes to foreign government officials.107 They would
also be required to enforce those laws barring supply-side bribery, as described
below. But, what they would not be required to do is criminalize demand-side
bribery by proscribing a government official’s acceptance of a bribe. Obliging
states to criminalize accepting bribes together with enforcing this commitment to
impose criminal sanctions on government officials at an international forum
would intrude on each state’s sovereignty.108
In addition to requiring states to criminalize supply-side foreign bribery, this
new treaty would prioritize prevention. The goal of the treaty is to reduce
corruption; it should therefore not rely on deterrence in the form of greater
enforcement to achieve that end. Preventive efforts could help curb corruption,
too. A books and records requirement that makes hiding foreign bribery more
difficult, like the books and records requirements of the OECD Convention and
the UNCAC,109 would be a helpful preventive effort. Another preventive effort
comes from the UNCAC, which recommends encouraging private sector codes
of conduct.110 Corporations could be encouraged to craft internal codes of
conduct. Participating in their regulation might motivate corporations to take the
anti-bribery laws seriously.111 A third preventive effort would be awarenessraising. OECD country monitoring reports assert that simple lack of awareness
of the crime of foreign bribery impedes enforcement.112 To ensure that
corporations, individuals, and law enforcement personnel are aware of not only
the crime of foreign bribery but also the detrimental effects of corruption, each
signatory could be obliged to engage in awareness-raising efforts. As an example,
a state could run a public service ad campaign.
Furthermore, this treaty would include substantive enforcement
requirements. The treaty would mandate that each state not only enact but also
enforce anti-bribery laws. States parties would be obliged to comply—in good
faith—with certain standards of adequate enforcement. These standards could
borrow from some of the indicators of enforcement or lack thereof examined by
106. Bussen, supra note 15, at 511.
107. See OECD Convention arts. 1, 2, supra note 61, 37 I.L.M. at 4 (requiring that states parties enact
legislation criminalizing foreign bribery on the part of legal or natural persons).
108. Bussen, supra note 15, at 511 (recommending against enforcement of passive bribery because it
intrudes on sovereignty).
109. OECD Convention art. 8, supra note 61, 37 I.L.M. at 5; UNCAC art. 12 ¶ 3, supra note 4, 2349
U.N.T.S. at 152.
110. UNCAC art. 12, ¶ 2(b), supra note 4, 2349 U.N.T.S. at 151.
111. Delaney, supra note 3, at 459.
112. See, e.g., OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION IN PORTUGAL 5 (2013) [hereinafter PORTUGAL PHASE 3], http://www.oecd.org/daf/antibribery/Portugalphase3reportEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/CEX5-S6PZ] (highlighting the lack of
awareness).
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the OECD when it conducts its country monitoring investigations to assess states’
enforcement of the OECD Convention.113 In this treaty, unlike the OECD
Convention, these standards and the good faith requirement would be explicitly
set out in the treaty.
First, each state would be obliged to address a majority of the bribery
allegations of which it had notice.114 Addressing one of these foreign bribery
allegations could mean anything from a thorough investigation to a prosecution
that ends in a settlement agreement to a conviction.115 Reports of a state’s
corporation or other national bribing public officials abroad could surface either
in the media or as told by a whistleblower. After this type of evidence becomes
public or otherwise known to the state, it would have a duty to address the
allegation against the offending corporation.
Second, a certain amount of resources would have to be dedicated to
prosecuting foreign bribery. OECD reports consider the resources put into
investigating and prosecuting foreign bribery as well as the expertise of those
involved in investigating and prosecuting foreign bribery.116 Similarly, this new
treaty would oblige states parties to devote resources to investigating and
prosecuting foreign bribery and to implement foreign-bribery-specific training
for police and prosecutors. Perhaps states could commit to spending the same
percent of their law enforcement budget as is spent on domestic bribery on
investigating and prosecuting foreign bribery.117 If domestic bribery is not part of

113. Country Monitoring of the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, OECD, http://www.oecd.org/daf/
anti-bribery/countrymonitoringoftheoecdanti-briberyconvention.htm
[https://perma.cc/4GU2-4ZZJ]
(last visited Nov. 15, 2015).
114. See, e.g., PORTUGAL PHASE 3, supra note 112, at 21–34 (discussing investigation and prosecution
of bribery as an indicator of sufficient enforcement).
115. See, e.g., OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION IN DENMARK 27–28 (2013), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Denmarkphase
3reportEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5ZH-BPJA] (raising concerns that Denmark is closing cases without
thoroughly investigating them); OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTIBRIBERY CONVENTION IN GREECE 19–21 (2012), http://www.oecd.org/daf/antibribery/Greecephase
3reportEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SNR-WXCW] (highlighting an instance when Greece did not open an
investigation following an allegation).
116. See, e.g., OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION IN BELGIUM 32 (2013), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/BelgiumPhase3
ReportEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/V3Z3-BWHG] (noting that Belgium’s enforcement of its anti-bribery
laws suffers from a “flagrant lack of resources”); OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE
OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN ICELAND 16 (2010), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/antibriberyconvention/Icelandphase3reportEN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A5FH-8QDK]
(noting
that
investigators with more expertise are needed and that specialized training on foreign bribery has not been
provided to either the judiciary or the law enforcement personnel); OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON
IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN ARGENTINA 30 (2014) [hereinafter
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Argentina-Phase-3-Report-ENG.pdf
ARGENTINA PHASE 3],
[https://perma.cc/QE2L-GWGZ] (specialized judges and prosecutors exist for domestic, but not foreign
bribery cases); OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION
IN LUXEMBOURG 34 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-briberyconvention/Luxembourg
phase3reportEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/MD4F-U7WV] (there is an increasing but still small number of
foreign bribery specialists).
117. See, e.g., ARGENTINA PHASE 3, supra note 116, at 30 (specialized judges and prosecutors exist
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the law enforcement budget, a state could devote the same percent of the budget
as is spent on another economic crime, such as money laundering. As an
alternative, the treaty could establish as a floor a certain default percent of the
law enforcement budget that would have to be dedicated to investigating and
prosecuting foreign bribery. This would preclude the possibility that a state could
cut funding for other economic crimes to avoid funding anti-bribery. States would
also be required to take steps for their prosecutors and police to attain an
appropriate level of expertise on the crime of foreign bribery. States would have
to staff a prosecutor’s office and a police unit specializing in foreign bribery, or
at least in economic crimes.118 And training on the crime of foreign bribery and
its elements would have to be provided to all prosecutors and law enforcement
officials.119
Third, like the OECD Convention, prosecutors, police, and judges who work
on anti-bribery matters would not be permitted to be subject to political control,
nor would prosecutors be allowed to consider economic factors when deciding
whether to pursue a particular investigation. The OECD Convention prohibits
judges, prosecutors, and police from considering the “national economic
interest” when evaluating a foreign bribery case.120 This treaty would implement
the same requirement. The national economic interest seems to be problematic
in two situations. The first is when prosecutorial discretion rests on a
determination of whether prosecution is in the “public interest.”121 In this case, it
is not necessarily clear that the national economic interest should not be part of
the public interest.122 The second is when prosecutors are either actually
permitted or are perceived to be permitted to take the national economic interest
into account.123 Both of those examples would be barred by this treaty. Further,
for domestic, but not foreign bribery cases); OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD
ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN SLOVENIA 9 (2014) [hereinafter SLOVENIA PHASE 3],
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/SloveniaPhase3ReportEN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3L8E-733Y]
(prioritizing combating domestic, but not foreign corruption).
118. See, e.g., OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION IN BULGARIA 21, 23 (2011),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-bribery
convention/Bulgariaphase3reportEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/KP6H-QFB9] (explaining that Bulgaria has
no specialists for complex economic crimes and is not capable of conducting a complex financial
investigation, describing general challenges of conducting complex financial investigation, like a foreign
bribery investigation).
119. See, e.g., OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION IN THE UNITED STATES 14 (2010), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/anti-bribery
convention/UnitedStatesphase3reportEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/5TXJ-WSUL] (noting the specialized
training provided to various agencies involved in investigating and prosecuting the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act).
120. OECD Convention art. 5, supra note 61, 37 I.L.M. at 5.
121. See, e.g., OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION IN SWEDEN 29 (2012), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Swedenphase3reportEN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3W84-UN87] (discussing the implications of the “public interest” standard that has not
been explicitly stated not to include the national economic interest).
122. Id.
123. See, e.g., SLOVENIA PHASE 3, supra note 117, at 30 (discussing the perception that prosecutors
are allowed to consider economic impact); OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD
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when engaging in country monitoring for compliance, the OECD examines
whether a country’s judges, prosecutors, or police are subject to political
influence.124 This new treaty would require both that legal safeguards to
independence be put in place and that judges, prosecutors, and police be
independent in practice. For example, elected officials contacting law
enforcement personnel to discuss particular, ongoing foreign bribery cases
amounts to political influence.125 Moreover, when the police, prosecutors, and
judges are under the supervision or control of a political body or are not legally
guaranteed independence, they are subject to political influence.126 Both
examples would be prohibited by the new treaty.
Finally, this treaty would come with an already existing enforcement forum—
the WTO DSM. Instead of merely monitoring countries that fail to prosecute
bribery, the new treaty would allow other countries to enforce their obligations
formally and internationally. This would increase incentives to prosecute bribery
domestically, because states could feel more confident that other states are
actually prosecuting bribery and because they would not want to have these
treaty obligations enforced against them in a visible forum.
V
WTO TREATY FEATURES: STANDING, BREACH, AND REMEDIES
A. Standing
States would be the only group with standing to sue under this new anticorruption treaty. The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU)
contemplates only member states having standing to sue and be sued.127 The
states are limited to making claims against state action.128 Thus, this new treaty
would be limited to allowing states to have standing to sue.
One question that arises is what incentive a state would have to sue on
corruption grounds.129 But even without an international forum, states with
ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN SOUTH AFRICA 34–35 (2014), http://www.oecd.org/daf/antibribery/SouthAfricaPhase3ReportEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8H2-P7FV] (though it has been amended,
South Africa required prosecutors to consider economic impact in the past).
124. See, e.g., ARGENTINA PHASE 3, supra note 116, at 33 (2014).
125. See, e.g., id.
126. See, e.g., id. at 35–37 (examining whether judges were independent); OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT
ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN BRAZIL 42–43 (2014),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Brazil-Phase-3-Report-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/QJM2-PMMD]
(evaluating the independence of various law enforcement institutions involved in investigating and
prosecuting foreign bribery); OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION
IN
THE
CZECH
REPUBLIC
30
(2013),
http://www.oecd.org/daf/antibribery/CzechRepublicphase3reportEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/R65L-LT92] (prosecutor’s office subject
to political oversight).
127. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15, 1994,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401
[hereinafter DSU].
128. Pauwelyn, supra note 52, at 261.
129. Id.
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robust enforcement frequently sue foreign individuals and corporations in
domestic courts.130 These states want other states to obey anti-corruption laws
and currently use domestic enforcement to encourage a level, non-corrupt
playing field.131 It thus seems likely that the same enthusiastic enforcer states
would use the WTO forum as an additional—perhaps better—platform not
subject to domestic jurisdictional restraints for promoting uniformity in the
enforcement of anti-corruption laws.
If standing were extended to a wider group of actors, perhaps including
private individuals and corporations, it could take a couple of different forms.
Private citizens could sue in foreign domestic courts, standing in for their
government.132 Or corruption disputes could follow the model for investment
disputes, which permits corporations to bring arbitral proceedings against
states.133 Indeed, a domestic private right of action is supposed to exist already;
Article 35 of the UNCAC should have created such a right of action for victims
of corruption.134 Perhaps involving private parties, which are likely to have
incentives to sue, especially when they suspect that they have lost business that
another party won by corrupt measures, would increase anti-corruption
enforcement. But that would require a new tribunal or new procedures in various
domestic courts.
Although the WTO does not permit all interested parties to have standing, it
does provide an established, often-used tribunal. Whether domestic courts would
actually allow the suggested proceedings or whether parties would actually use
some new tribunal is unknown. What is known is that parties use and respect the
WTO DSM, giving it a strong advantage in enforcing anti-corruption laws.
B. Breach
Noncompliance with the enforcement requirements could manifest itself in
different ways. States parties could breach the treaty by failing to meet any of the
preventive, legislative, or enforcement requirements. This section will focus on
breaches of the enforcement requirements. To breach the enforcement
requirements, a country could fail to address most of the foreign bribery
allegations of which it was on notice, or it could fail to address one particularly
high profile allegation; a country could provide inadequate enforcement
resources, including monetary resources, training, and expertise; or a country
could allow consideration of economic factors or allow its police, prosecutors,
and judges to be politically influenced.
Almost inevitably, the parties will disagree on whether the action or inaction
amounted to a breach. When a claim of breach is brought against a state at the
130. Bussen, supra note 15, at 496.
131. See Brewster, supra note 7, at 99–101 (2014).
132. Paul D. Carrington, Private Enforcement of International Law, in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY:
CAN INTERNATIONAL ACTORS PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE, supra note 8, at 285, 285.
133. Id.
134. UNCAC art. 35, supra note 4, 2349 U.N.T.S. at 161; MAKINWA, supra note 79, at 369–70.
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WTO on the grounds of failure to address a foreign bribery allegation, the
responding state could deny the claim and offer explanations of why it did not
investigate and prosecute a particular individual or corporation. Perhaps it was
not a significant case, or simultaneously some other significant case needed more
resources. Perhaps the corporation was particularly sympathetic and had recently
imposed a new, more stringent code of conduct that had not yet taken hold. As
in domestic court cases, whether a breach occurred would be a question of fact
for the WTO Panel to resolve.
Furthermore, the substantive enforcement obligations imposed by the treaty
will provide guidance as to what constitutes a breach. This might alleviate the
problem of figuring out what constitutes a treaty breach in the case of
enforcement.135 For example, a respondent state would breach the treaty if it
failed to provide specific foreign anti-bribery training to its police and
prosecutors, or if it provided either funding below the default amount required
or less funding to foreign anti-bribery laws than to domestic anti-bribery laws. A
state would also be in breach of its treaty obligations if it allowed its prosecutors
or police to consider the “national economic interest”136 or if it did not permit
prosecutors, police, or judges to act independently and without political control.
These claims might be more challenging for a complaining state to prove, given
the potentially subtle and difficult-to-detect ways in which police, prosecutors,
and judges can factor in the “national economic interest” or take into account
political influence.
Complainant states could bring claims based on either patterns of not
enforcing the anti-corruption laws or based on a single (likely high-profile)
instance of not enforcing the anti-corruption laws. Because proof of lack of
enforcement could be difficult in a one-off situation, claims would probably be
brought based on patterns of failure to enforce the anti-corruption laws. For
patterns of failure to meet the enforcement obligations, breach would likely be
easier to prove because several obligations might have been breached. There
could be evidence suggesting that prosecutors are taking the national economic
interest into account or are subject to de facto political control, such as a high
number of allegations involving major national corporations but not a
correspondingly high number of investigations or prosecutions of those
corporations.137 But proving this type of claim would nonetheless be challenging,
because even indicative evidence would not definitively prove that prosecutors
are, in practice, allowed to consider economic factors or that government officials
exercise de facto control over foreign bribery cases. However, if the complaining
state could prove breach of a more objective standard, such as failing to meet the
135. See Brewster, supra note 7, at 105 (raising the question of how to determine breach and what
happens if the parties do not agree about what a breach is).
136. OECD Convention art. 5, supra note 61, 37 I.L.M. at 5.
137. See, e.g., OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION IN SPAIN 41 (2012), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/Spainphase3reportEN.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RP4X-R9HY] (questioning prosecutorial independence because of the low number of
investigations and lack of prosecutions).
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amount of resources threshold, it would still succeed in its claim.
In addition to a claim for breach, states could bring a claim for non-violation.
Under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), states are allowed
to bring claims even when treaty obligations have not necessarily been
breached.138 There are three elements to a non-violation claim under the GATT:
“(1) application of a measure by a WTO Member; (2) a benefit accruing under
the relevant agreement; and (3) nullification or impairment of the benefit as the
result of the application of the measure.”139 The claim in a non-violation case is
typically that the complaining party had “legitimate expectations of improved
market-access opportunities” that were thwarted by the responding party’s
actions.140
This treaty could echo the GATT and allow non-violation claims. Two
examples of situations that could give rise to a non-violation claim under this
treaty are as follows. First, under this proposed treaty, countries would have a
duty to address a majority of foreign bribery allegations when on notice. Those
that do not want to meaningfully address foreign bribery allegations might
dismiss allegations out of hand as unreliable or close investigations too quickly.141
Moreover, they could quickly destroy records of what happened with a closed
investigation so that it would be difficult to tell whether the investigation was
conducted thoroughly and in good faith.142 These actions might not amount to a
breach of the treaty, but they could thwart legitimate expectations that the
complaining country’s corporations would have the chance to compete honestly
for foreign government contracts.
Second, states would be required to guarantee the independence of police,
prosecutors, and judges, and to bar consideration of economic factors. This could
be another area in which states could nominally comply with their obligations
while subverting them in practice. A given state could legally guarantee
independence while subtly using political influence in practice. In this situation,
the available indicators would probably be a series of cases against high-profile
companies and individuals that have been closed early or dropped before
prosecution.143 This type of situation leads working groups conducting OECD
country-monitoring evaluations to believe that either those responsible for
138. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XXIII, ¶ 1(b), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1, 1867 U.N.T.S. 187.
139. Panel Report, Japan—Measures Affecting Consumer Photographic Film and Paper, ¶ 10.41,
WTO Doc. WT/DS44/R (adopted Apr. 22, 1998).
140. Id. at ¶¶ 10.41, 10.61.
141. See, e.g., PORTUGAL PHASE 3, supra note 112, at 22–24 (many cases were closed after
preliminary investigations and in some cases, no inquiries were made).
142. See, e.g., OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY
CONVENTION IN KOREA 11–12 (2011), http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/antibriberyconvention/
Koreaphase3reportEN.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3C3-RPYT] (Korea routinely destroys case records after
a certain period of time).
143. PORTUGAL PHASE 3, supra note 112, at 28–29 (indicating the Working Group’s concern that
there were many cases involving high-profile persons and corporations, none of which have been
prosecuted).
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investigation and prosecution are considering economic factors or that the same
people are being improperly influenced by government officials.144 There might
not be enough evidence to prove that states are breaching their obligations. And
perhaps the behavior is sufficiently ambiguous that it would not amount to a
breach even with perfect evidence. But if enough cases involving high-profile
companies and individuals are dropped or closed before prosecution, a
complaining state would at least be able to argue that this state is undermining
legitimate expectations.
C. Remedies
Remedying corruption at the WTO is difficult, and no option is without flaws.
Nonetheless, there are several options for remedies at the WTO. Initially, if a
Panel or Appellate Body report finds a member state noncompliant, the member
state is given a certain amount of time during which it is supposed to bring its
actions into compliance.145 Bringing its actions into compliance in the future
should mean that the noncompliant state thoroughly investigates and perhaps
prosecutes the next allegation of foreign bribery by a national. The reasonable
period of time, which is the time allowed by the WTO for the noncompliant state
to bring its actions into appropriate compliance,146 should therefore be the time
it takes for a new, credible allegation to surface plus the time a thorough
investigation would take.
If the noncompliant state remains noncompliant after the reasonable period
of time, then the complaining country can bring the case back to the WTO and a
Compliance Panel can assess remedies.147 The WTO allows “suspension of
concessions” by the complaining state, meaning that retaliation in the form of
trade sanctions may be imposed.148 If the source of the bribery could be proven,
that is, whether the instance of bribery could be best categorized as trade in goods
or trade in services, then concessions could be suspended in the same sector.149
Otherwise, concessions could be suspended in any of the agreements.150
A difficult issue is how the level of nullification or impairment is to be
determined. Remedies must be “equivalent to the level of nullification or
impairment.”151 This means that a state is permitted to retaliate up to the amount
by which the noncompliant state’s actions have caused nullification or
impairment of the anticipated benefits of trade. That level is calculated by

144. See, e.g., id. (the Working Group was worried that economic or political factors were influencing
the prosecutors involved in these cases).
145. DSU art. 21.3.
146. DSU art. 21.
147. DSU art. 22.2, 22.3.
148. DSU art. 22.2.
149. See DSU art. 22.3 (articulating the principle that concessions should be suspended in the same
agreement if possible, but can be suspended in other agreements).
150. See DSU art. 22.3.
151. DSU art. 22.4.
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assessing the lost trade flows caused by the noncompliant state’s actions.152
Ultimately, it is up to a WTO decisionmaker to decide the amount by which the
complaining state has lost trade flows, and, accordingly, the level of retaliation
that the complaining state is permitted to impose.153 Therefore, valuing
nullification and impairment is central to imposing remedies.
One possible claim would be that the complaining country was deprived of
the opportunity to bid honestly. Then, the way to calculate the level of
nullification or impairment is to value the lost opportunity of the complaining
country, whose national presumably lost a bid for a project to the respondent
country’s national. Under the present WTO case law, lost opportunity cannot be
used as the measure for nullification and impairment, because it is unknown
whether the complaining country would otherwise have won the contract, thus
the lost opportunity is merely speculative.154 However, treaties are allowed to
create special rules for dispute settlement that trump the usual rules set forth in
the DSU.155 This treaty could provide that nullification and impairment includes
lost opportunity, thus overriding the existing case law only for disputes arising
under this treaty. The Compliance Panel would then assume that the complainant
country would have won the bid but for the bribery, and evaluate the value of the
lost opportunity. The major challenge of this method is valuing lost opportunity.
The Compliance Panel could look at the actual benefits that accrued to the
company that won the bid as a benchmark, but that does not necessarily represent
the lost opportunity. Due to the nature of this remedy—that it represents the lost
opportunity from a particular bid—it would be a one-time, lump-sum amount
rather than an annual amount. Although valuation would be difficult, this remedy
assessment is probably the best fit for the WTO, because it corresponds to the
idea of nullification and impairment being the lost trade flows from a violation of
WTO law.
Perhaps another solution is to borrow a private contract remedy. Contract
price adjustment has been suggested as a corruption remedy.156 This would adjust
the price of the contract tainted by bribery to the non-bribery price of the same
contract.157 A similar assessment could be used to determine the level of
nullification and impairment. The disputing parties could offer evidence on the
non-bribery price of various contracts and transactions, and the Compliance
Panel could then determine the level of nullification and impairment from this
amount. One problem with this method is that the remedies at the WTO are
152. Decision by the Arbitrators, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat and Meat
Products (Hormones), ¶¶ 40–42, WTO Doc. WT/DS26/ARB (circulated July 12, 1999).
153. Id.
154. Panel Report, Norway—Procurement of Toll Collection Equipment for the City of Trondheim,
¶¶ 4.17, 4.20, 4.26, WTO Doc. GPR/DS2/R (adopted May 13, 1992).
155. DSU art. 1.2.
156. Olaf Meyer, The Formation of a Transnational Ordre Public against Corruption: Lessons for and
from Arbitral Tribunals, in ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICY: CAN INTERNATIONAL ACTORS PLAY A
CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE, supra note 8, at 229, 242.
157. Id.
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meant to be based on lost trade flows, and this method values overpayment of
contracts but not lost trade flows. It is also difficult to assess the value of similar,
honest contracts, because parties can contest what qualifies as a similar contract
and can question whether some other example contract was also the result of
bribery.
Perhaps for proven systemic failure to comply with anti-corruption
enforcement obligations, corporations and persons from the violator’s state could
be barred from bidding on government projects of other WTO member states.158
This remedy could be reserved for particularly egregious offenders. But this
method also has its downsides. Harsh as it seems, it is easy to circumvent. These
companies could simply form new subsidiaries in other locations and use those to
bid on projects.
One difficulty with the WTO remedy structure as a whole is that it is purely
prospective. Thus, it has the potential to resolve systemic non-enforcement of
anti-corruption obligations but cannot remedy a one-off instance of corruption.159
A state could, therefore, let a few instances of corruption slide without
repercussions, as long as it returns to compliance. This problem—the so-called
“remedy gap”—is inherent in all WTO disputes.160 A state can begin violating a
WTO agreement and can continue to do so until not only a claim is brought to
the DSM but also a decision of noncompliance is made and a subsequent
reasonable period of time has passed.161 At this point, the state could simply come
back to compliance and suffer no remedial consequences.162 Even if the state
continues to breach its obligations and is brought to a Compliance Panel that
assesses remedies and permits retaliation against the state, the state will be
subject to that retaliation only going forward.163 It does not have to provide
compensation for past violations.164 And the retaliation is only for present
noncompliance starting from the end of the reasonable period of time, not for the
prior noncompliance that resulted in the adverse ruling in the first place.165 But,
even if no remedy is truly satisfactory, there are other factors that motivate
compliance with WTO treaties.
Notably, WTO member states do not exploit the remedy gap as frequently as
they could.166 This is likely because the powerful countries that most influenced

158. See Nichols, supra note 5, at 379 (suggesting that a violating state’s corporations be barred from
doing business with other WTO members as a minimum penalty).
159. Pauwelyn, supra note 52, at 261–62.
160. Rachel Brewster, The Remedy Gap: Institutional Design, Retaliation, and Trade Law
Enforcement, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 102 (2011).
161. Id. at 111.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 110.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Mark Wu, Rethinking the Temporary Breach Puzzle: A Window on the Future of International
Trade Conflicts, 40 YALE J. INT’L L. 95, 107 (2015).
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the system’s structure also receive the most benefit from the WTO’s rules.167
Therefore, these states have an incentive to follow the rules themselves and to
wield their power to induce other states to do the same.168
Reputational effects likely also influence the behavior of WTO member
states.169 Most cases brought at the WTO settle instead of moving forward to a
panel ruling.170 The WTO, as an international forum for resolving disputes, can
“brand violating parties as being uncooperative treaty partners.”171 Because the
WTO offers only prospective remedies that might not deter breaches of WTO
law, there are likely other factors that encourage compliance with WTO
treaties.172 The vast majority of WTO DSM rulings are in favor of the complaining
party, thus the responding party might feel political pressure to settle rather than
risk being publicly named a violator of treaties.173 States that are less embedded
in the international trade system feel the most reputational pressure and,
accordingly, settle the earliest and most often.174 They still hope to enter into
many future treaties and join other international organizations.175 Potential treaty
partners might not want to enter into an agreement with a bad treaty partner.176
Therefore, being labeled a violator could have serious repercussions for a state
trying to negotiate a new agreement or join an international organization.177
Meanwhile, states that are embedded in the international trade system are
already party to many treaties and belong to many international organizations.178
Future opportunities for entering into a new agreement are limited.179 Thus,
reputational concerns are not felt as strongly by these states.180
It is possible that a country’s embarrassment over having a WTO report
publicly declare that it is not enforcing its anti-bribery laws would be sufficient to
convince it to come into compliance. In that case, remedies would not come into
play at all. If reputational concerns can induce settlement, then perhaps they can
induce compliance post-report adoption, too.181
States might not exploit the remedy gap as much as they could, and
167. Id. at 138.
168. Id. at 140.
169. Jiwon Lee & Teresa Wittgenstein, Weak vs. Strong Ties: Explaining Early Settlement in WTO
Disputes (forthcoming).
170. Id. (manuscript at 13).
171. Id. (manuscript at 15–16).
172. Id. (manuscript at 40).
173. Id. (manuscript at 46).
174. Id. (manuscript at 55–56).
175. Id. (manuscript at 46–49).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See id. (manuscript at 46–47) (“An adverse ruling by a panel widely broadcasts to the
international audience that the defendant has defected on the agreed on terms of its multilateral trade
obligations.”).
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reputational concerns probably deter breach without need for remedies.
Nonetheless, breaches of WTO obligations do happen. But, even if some
instances of lack of punishment of corruption cannot be remedied or deterred,
remedies that target and deter systemic lack of punishment of corruption will
nonetheless reduce corruption. Corruption can never be eliminated, but it can be
reduced. If the WTO can achieve reduction, it will have done enough.
VI
CONCLUSION
The current international anti-corruption approach has resulted in growing
awareness that corruption is a real problem rather than a necessary, if unsavory,
transaction cost. It has also improved coordination of domestic legislation; states
parties to the UNCAC or the OECD Convention have similar anti-corruption
laws. Yet there is still room for improvement. Enforcement levels remain low.
Enforcement is presently domestic only, and what it means to enforce the antibribery laws of a treaty is unclear.
This note proposed a new treaty as a solution to one part of the enforcement
problem. The new, recommended treaty would target a specific corruption
problem—supply-side foreign bribery. This would not be the first treaty to target
this facet of corruption, but its new features could build upon and improve the
existing framework. Not only would legislation be required, but enforcement
would be required as well. The treaty would offer guidance on what level of
enforcement countries are obliged to reach, eliminating some uncertainty.
Furthermore, this treaty would come with the WTO’s DSM, so parties could use
an international dispute settlement forum to enforce enforcement. The
substantive enforcement requirements together with the international forum at
which other states can file complaints against a breaching state could make higher
levels of enforcement a real possibility. Improving enforcement of supply-side
foreign bribery laws is only one aspect of reducing corruption. But decreasing
corruption is difficult to do all at once. This proposed treaty could be one more
step in the right direction—towards a more uniform, consistent, and effective
international anti-corruption regime.

